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I wonder if he [Anders Nygren] is not trying to force on the conception of
love an antithesis which it is the precise nature of love, in all its forms, to
overcome.1

Introduction: After Eros
C. S. Lewis read Anders Nygren’s Agape and Eros in his mid-thirties, probably
during the Christmas holiday of 1934.2 His irst recorded thoughts, including the
statement above, are from a letter dated “Jan 8th 1935” to his Oxford colleague
Janet Spens. Despite his decisive criticism of what he calls Nygren’s “central
contrast”—that agape is selless and eros self-regarding—Lewis ends this letter
with a declaration of uncertainty: “However, I must tackle him again. He has shaken
me up extremely.” It is remarkable, then, that Nygren is not mentioned by name

*
For longsuffering help in the form of written and oral feedback on earlier drafts of this article,
the author would like to thank Judith Wolfe, Aku Visala, Michael Ward, Bruce R. Johnson, Rope
Kojonen, Iisa Lepojärvi, Jussi Ruokomäki, Richard Lyne, and Werner Jeanrond.
1
C. S. Lewis, Collected Letters (ed. Walter Hooper; 3 vols.; London: HarperCollins, 2000–2006)
2:153.
2
The Swedish original of Nygren’s Agape and Eros was published in two parts in 1930 and
1936, and the English translation in three volumes: in 1932 (Part 1), 1938 (Part 2, vol. 1), and 1939
(Part 2, vol. 2), and inally as a revised one-volume edition in 1953. Lewis was referring to Part 1,
since Part 2 had not been published, and it remains unclear whether he ever read Part 2. Hereafter
all citations are from the one-volume Harper & Row edition (1969), a reprint of the 1953 edition,
and are abbreviated AE (page references to this book appear in parentheses in the text).
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in Lewis’s The Four Loves (1960). Lewis’s opening remarks on his theology of
love, which do not directly refer to Nygren, “are critical of Nygren’s main thesis
in Agape and Eros.”3
Walter Hooper explains that Lewis went on considering the relation of agape
and eros for years. In The Four Loves (FL), he “discusses them under the names
‘gift-love’ and ‘need-love’ (using ‘Eros’ to mean sexual love).”4 Lewis introduces
these key concepts on the very irst page, and it is their non-antithetical nature that
pits him irmly against Nygren. This is another remarkable fact about The Four
Loves: Lewis’s refutation of Nygren’s central contrast, the denigration of eros and
its separation from agape, is executed without using the words “eros” or “agape”
in the Nygrenian sense at all.
These opening remarks deine his two key concepts that, in turn, encompass
the “four” types of love.
“God is love,” says St. John. When I irst tried to write this book I thought
that his maxim would provide me with a very plain highroad through the
whole subject. I thought I should be able to say that human loves deserved to
be called loves at all just in so far as they resembled that Love which is God.
The irst distinction I made was therefore between what I called Gift-love and
Need-love. The typical example of Gift-love would be that love which moves
a man to work and plan and save for the future well-being of his family
which he will die without sharing or seeing; of the second, that which sends
a lonely or frightened child to its mother’s arms.5

Lewis posits that there was no doubt about which love most resembled God’s
own: “Divine Love is Gift-love.” And so, Lewis tells us, he was looking forward
to writing “fairly easy panegyrics” on the irst sort of love and “disparagements”
of the second (FL, 9).
However, every time he tried to deny the name love for need-love he “ended
in puzzles and contradictions.” The reality was more complicated than he had
supposed. First, he felt he was doing violence to the rich lexicons for types of
love found in other languages, which contain “stored insight and experience”
(9). Secondly, needfulness belongs to given human nature. There is an “innocent
Need” (149) inherent in our creaturely condition. Why should we call it selish?
Sometimes there may be a need to subdue it, but not to feel it is “the mark of the
cold egoist . . . a bad spiritual symptom” (11). Thirdly, needfulness, Lewis believed,
belongs to elevated human nature as well. Our spiritual health is proportional to
our love for God, which must always be predominantly a need-love, and so needlove “either coincides with or at least makes a main ingredient in man’s highest,
3

Caroline Simon, “On Love,” in The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis (ed. Robert MacSwain
and Michael Ward; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 146–59, at 154.
4
Lewis, Collected Letters, 2:154 n. 3.
5
C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960) 9. Hereafter FL (page references
to this book appear in parentheses in the text).
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healthiest, and most realistic spiritual condition” (12). In fact, it would be “a bold
and silly creature that came before its Creator with the boast ‘I’m no beggar. I love
you disinterestedly’ ” (12). We are quite far from Nygren’s suspicion of needfulness
as a corruptive human impulse.
This proximity to, but rejection of, Nygren’s “central contrast” has not gone
unnoticed among scholars. Perhaps the irst to home in on it was the English
theologian V. A. Demant, who reviewed The Four Loves immediately in 1960.
Professor C. S. Lewis has evidently been dissatisied with some too simple
classiications of the expressions of love, which have become current in
recent discussion. There has been, for example, the theological contrast . . .
made popular by a second-hand acquaintance with Nygren’s thesis that eros
is human and agape the divine love. A greater falsity has become common
among moralists who would put down every motive short of supernatural
charity as a form of egoism. . . . He [Lewis] makes his own terminology,
and very useful it is. Especially could it help those who found themselves
lost in the more ponderous treatments of love by Nygren, de Rougemont and
Father D’Arcy.6

Much later, in 1974, a German philosopher also connected the dots. Commenting
on Lewis’s aborted idea of disparaging need-love, Josef Pieper writes: “That such
an attitude is assumed, before relection, reveals to what extent the relective
consciousness and the atmosphere of thought, especially of Christian thought
concerning love, has already been molded by a particular conception. . . . the
antithesis of eros and agape.”7 A few years after Pieper, the American theologian
Gilbert Meilaender (1978) also connects Lewis’s gift-love and need-love with
Nygren’s agape and eros respectively, but not without an essential caveat, as we
shall presently see.8 The Four Loves, which opens with “some sly remarks” on how
easy the author thought his task would be, has been recognized by London-born
theologian Oliver O’Donovan (1991) as “one of the most popular contributions”

6
V. A. Demant, “Four Loves,” review of The Four Loves, by C. S. Lewis, Frontier (Spring
1960) 207–209, at 207. Another theologically astute reviewer that same year found it “interesting
to compare Anders Nygren’s concept of agape with Lewis’ view of charity” and notes that “Nygren
does not consider, as does Lewis, that God might create within himself a need for our love so that
we can enter more fully into communion with him” (Donald G. Bloesch, “Love Illuminated,” review
of The Four Loves, by C. S. Lewis, Christian Century [14 December 1960] 1470).
7
Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (trans. Richard and Clara Winston; San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1997) 210. Pieper calls Nygren the most inluential “representative” of this prevailing
atmosphere of thought instead of its “augurer,” because several theologians in the 1920’s and 1930’s
were juxtaposing “eros” and “Christian love” (variously understood): e.g., Heinrich Scholz in Eros
und Caritas (1929) and Emil Brunner in Eros und Liebe (1937). Nygren’s book has had “almost
incalculable inluence, although it itself may well spring from an idea that has always been present
in Christendom” (Pieper, Love, 211).
8
Gilbert Meilaender, The Taste for the Other: The Social and Ethical Thought of C. S. Lewis
(2nd ed.; Vancouver: Regent College, 2003) 56–57.
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to the Nygren debate.9 More recently, the Finnish theologian Risto Saarinen (2006)
has also noted how Lewis’s model “obviously clashes” with Nygren’s and how
“the showdown is probably conscious.”10
None of these scholars explicitly claims that Lewis’s need-love is an exhaustive
translation of Nygren’s eros. One occasionally gets the feeling, however, that it is
implicitly assumed. This would be unwise. Insofar as need encapsulates one element
in eros, the pairing of them is insightful. Lewis’s letters are quite forthcoming in this
respect. For instance, twenty years after irst reading Nygren’s book, he explains:
The great merit of Nygren, so far as I’m concerned, was that he gave one a
new tool of thought: it is so v. [very] convenient and illuminating to be able
to talk (and therefore to think) about the two elements of love as Eros &
Agape. You notice that I say “elements”. That is because I think he drives his
contrast too hard and even talks as if the one cd. [could] not exist where the
other was. But surely in any good friendship or good marriage . . . the two
are always mixed. . . . I doubt whether even fallen man is totally incapable
of Agape. It is preigured even on the instinctive level. Maternal affection,
even among animals, has the dawn of Agape. So, in a queer way, has even
the sexual appetite, for each sex wants to give pleasure as well as to get it.
So there is a soil even in nature for [Agape] to strike roots in, or a trellis up
[which] it can grow.11

Lewis gives another inquirer the same account: “Nygren’s Eros & Agape gave me
a good ‘load of thought’, a useful classiication instrument, tho’ I don’t think his
own use of that instrument v. [very] proitable.”12
It seems relatively uncontroversial to assume that by the “new tool of thought”
and the “useful classiication instrument,” Lewis means eros and agape in terms
of what he called Nygren’s “central contrast”—selless versus self-regarding
love. “Need-love” and “gift-love” are indeed the terms he later adopted to more
systematically discuss what is already anticipated in these letters. The pairing of
Lewis’s need-love with Nygren’s eros by later scholars is not wholly inaccurate, but
it is part of the purpose of this article to show that it has not been precise enough.
Meilaender’s caveat offers the irst important qualiication. He notes that to
draw a parallel between Nygren’s eros/agape distinction and Lewis’s need-love/
gift-love distinction is not entirely satisfactory because, unlike Nygren, Lewis “is
not making a simple contrast between human love and divine love.” For Lewis, both
need-love and gift-love “are natural components of human love.”13 This proviso
is actually a double qualiication: it is another way of saying that Lewis regarded
9
Oliver O’Donovan, “Foreword to the 1991 Edition,” in John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of
the Religion of St. Augustine (1938; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007) v–vii, at v.
10
Risto Saarinen, “Eros, leikki ja normi: Rakkauden fundamentaaliteologiaa,” Teologinen
aikakauskirja (Finnish Theological Journal) (2006) 167–77, at 172 n. 15.
11
Lewis, Collected Letters, 3:538 [italics in original].
12
Ibid., 3:980.
13
Meilaender, Taste for the Other, 57.
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both need-love and gift-love as non-sinful, natural components of human love. To
describe the contrast of eros and agape as “victory for Eros” (AE, 231) or “betrayal
of Agape” (232) (as Nygren does) is thus doubly misleading.
But even further corrections are necessary. In addition to need-love as a naturally
good thing, God can bestow “two other gifts”: a “supernatural” need-love for
one another and for Himself (FL, 147). In other words, God can grace us with an
intensiied need of one another and a irmer awareness of our unshakable need
of Himself. Such elevated need-love forever ousts what G. K. Chesterton called
“a self-suficiency that is the very opposite of sanctity.”14 What is more, in The
Problem of Pain (1940) Lewis argues that we are even justiied in talking about
God’s need-love. In some sense we are “the needed and desired of God.”15 With
this, too, Lewis glaringly distances himself from Nygren.
The previous paragraphs’ caveats and qualiications may sound like “a dizzying
variety of formulations,”16 but they are certainly not trivial hair-splitting and
hopefully have not put off any reader. The reason for including them here has been
to show that need-love is not synonymous with eros. They are indeed in many ways
quite unlike each other. The need for such laborious qualiications (I mentioned but
the most obvious) raises interesting questions. If need-love does not holistically
capture the meaning of eros, do other concepts in Lewis’s taxonomy of love catch
the leftovers? Or is there perhaps a more comprehensive translation available that
apprehends more of eros than does need-love alone? Where does Nygren’s eros
land in Lewis’s theology of love?
I believe it lands not far from Lewis’s understanding of spiritual longing, coupled
with what he calls “appreciative love.” The German-speaking world knows this
longing as Sehnsucht, but readers of Lewis simply call it “Joy.”
Nygren’s distrust of Sehnsucht runs deep. Burnaby has put his inger on it:
“Where others see a praeparatio evangelica, he [Nygren] is more disposed to ind
a praeparatio daemonica.”17 Nygren believed that all longing and desire falls under
14

G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1933; repr., New York: Doubleday, 2001) 109.
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (London: HarperCollins, 1998, 1st ed. 1940) 35. After
strongly afirming the doctrine of God’s impassibility, Lewis suddenly “backs off” (Nicholas
Wolterstorff, “C. S. Lewis on the Problem of Suffering,” The Chronicle of the Oxford University
C. S. Lewis Society [2010] 3–20, at 5). Lewis then almost qualiies this doctrine: “Hence, if God
sometimes speaks as though the Impassible could suffer passion and eternal fullness could be in
want, and in want of those beings on whom it bestows all from their bare existence upwards, this
can only mean, if it means anything intelligible by us, that God of mere miracle has made himself
able so to hunger and created in Himself that which we can satisfy. . . . Before and behind all the
relations of God to man, as we now learn them from Christianity, yawns the abyss of a Divine
act of pure giving—the election of man, from nonentity, to be the beloved of God, and therefore
(in some sense) the needed and desired of God, who but for that act needs and desires nothing”
(Problem of Pain, 35–36 [italics added]).
16
Meilaender, Taste for the Other, 59: “When we begin to ask what Lewis means by divine
gift-love we encounter a dizzying variety of formulations.”
17
Burnaby, Amor Dei, 16.
15
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egocentric and self-deifying eros, even “that ‘love for God’ which means yearning
desire for God, Gottessehnsucht, is essentially an expression of man’s longing
and pining” (AE, 141 [italics in original]). The distinctive features of his eros he
sums up under three headings: “(1) Eros is the ‘love of desire’, or acquisitive love;
(2) Eros is man’s way to the Divine; (3) Eros is egocentric love” (175). The eros
Nygren distrusted and the Joy that fascinated Lewis all his life, preparing him for
conversion, surprisingly have much in common. It is the overall task of this article
to analyze their relation in more detail.
My argument will continue to unfold as follows. In the next section, I will briely
introduce Lewis’s concept of Joy, which he calls “a kind of love.” This will lay
the foundation for a systematic comparative analysis of eros and Joy, executed
in the three following sections according to the three main features of Nygren’s
eros. I will conclude by drawing together the relevant afinities between the two
concepts and acknowledging the remaining differences. Much of the argument
is based on internal evidence. Lewis’s writings do, however, include at least ten
explicit references to Nygren.18 Many of these, I will argue, support my conviction
that Lewis himself never intended his need-love as an exhaustive interpretation of
Nygren’s eros—but of which the concept of Joy, together with appreciative love,
captures a signiicant portion.

“A Kind of Love”
The “Joy” in the title of Surprised by Joy is a cleverly simple term for a desire or
longing for joy beyond the offerings of the natural world. It can be described both
as ecstatic wonder and causeless melancholy. Lewis himself called it “a dialectic
of desire”19 and a “lived dialectic,”20 as both it and its mysterious object felt ever
elusive. Joy is the bittersweet pursuit of the intangible appearing in the guise of
the tangible.
Early aesthetic experiences, Lewis says, “taught me longing—Sehnsucht; made
me for good or ill, and before I was six years old, a votary of the Blue Flower” (SJ,
14).21 The theme of his early poem Dymer (1926), written prior to his conversion,

18
Seven of these ten references are found in Lewis’s letters: see Collected Letters, 2:147, 153–54,
158, 165; and 3:538, 555, 980. The remaining three are found in his literary magnum opus The
Oxford History of English Literature in the Sixteenth Century: Excluding Drama (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1954) 383; his autobiography Surprised by Joy (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955)
198; and in his review (1938) of Leone Ebreo’s The Philosophy of Love, reprinted in Image and
Imagination: Essays and Reviews (ed. Walter Hooper; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2013) 277–80, at 279.
19
Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 207, hereafter abbreviated SJ (page references to this book appear
in parentheses in the text).
20
C. S. Lewis, The Pilgrim’s Regress (1933; repr., London: HarperCollins, 1998) xv, hereafter
abbreviated PR (page references to this book appear in parentheses in the text)..
21
A reference to the German poet Novalis’s “Blue Flower of Longing.”
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was “romantic longing—Sehnsucht.”22 The Pilgrim’s Regress, his allegorical
spiritual autobiography, also speaks of paradoxical immortal longings that are
“acute and even painful, yet the mere wanting is felt to be somehow a delight” (PR,
xii). And in his Cosmic Trilogy, we read of “the inconsolable wound with which
man is born,” the aches and yearnings which enigmatically are “the fore-runners of
[a] goddess.”23 She happens to be Venus (Aphrodite), the goddess of love herself.
A turning point in Lewis’s understanding of Joy was reading George
MacDonald’s fairytale Phantastes as a young boy.24 In his anthology of MacDonald,
Lewis explains: “I had crossed a great frontier. I had already been waist-deep in
Romanticism . . . but there was a difference.”25 What was the difference, the new
quality he found? “I should have been shocked in my teens if anyone had told me
that what I learned to love in Phantastes was goodness”26 or simply “Holiness”
(SJ, 169). This Joy related to the living God he did not know till years later. What
this book did, he remembers, was “to convert, even to baptize . . . my imagination.
It did nothing to my intellect nor (at the time) to my conscience. Their turn came
far later and with the help of many other books and men.”27
One of these other books was The Idea of the Holy (1923) by Rudolf Otto, which
Lewis read in his late twenties. In 1958, responding to Corbin Carnell’s queries on
the matter (in the very same letter that mentions Agape and Eros having given him
“a load of thought”), Lewis says that he has been “deeply inluenced” by Otto’s
Das Heilige. Otto’s historical and psychological analysis of “religious awe” and its
relation to the holy (which he calls the “numinous”) made a profound impression
on Lewis, and its impact only “seemed to increase with time.”28 Lewis drew upon
it, sometimes explicitly, as in the theory of religion set forth in The Problem of
Pain (4–12), and sometimes implicitly, as in his Cosmic Trilogy.29 The accounts
of Joy in The Pilgrim’s Regress and Surprised by Joy echo—sometimes almost
verbatim—Otto’s account of numinous awe.

22
This is acknowledged in the preface Lewis wrote for the 1950 reprint of the book, cited in
Corbin S. Carnell, Bright Shadow: Spiritual Longing in C. S. Lewis (1974; repr., Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 1999) 56 n. 17.
23
C. S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength (1945; repr., London: HarperCollins, 2005) 448.
24
David C. Downing has described it as “an emotional and spiritual watershed” for Lewis (Into
the Region of Awe: Mysticism in C. S. Lewis [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2005] 38).
25
C. S. Lewis, George MacDonald: An Anthology (1946; repr., New York: HarperCollins,
2001) xxxvii.
26
Lewis, George MacDonald, xxxviii–xxxix.
27
Ibid., xxxviii. See also SJ, 171.
28
Carnell, Bright Shadow, 69, 57.
29
A short analysis of the idea of the numinous in the Cosmic Trilogy can be found in Carnell,
Bright Shadow, 96–97. For a recent discussion of Das Heilige’s inluence on Till We Have Faces
see Risto Saarinen, “Natural Moral Law in Mere Christianity and Till We Have Faces: Does Lewis
Change His View?” (forthcoming).
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Lewis was of course not the irst or only Christian to have been acutely sensitive
to beauty and troubled by an unsatisied longing. Augustine, to whom Lewis’s “own
glad debts are incalculable,” (FL, 137) was, too. As Burnaby writes, for Augustine
“the beauty of nature is ‘numinous’, overwhelming: it is an ‘almost unspeakable’
beauty that must ‘ill with awe everyone who contemplates it.’ ”30 The dominant
characteristic of his understanding of Christian love “is desiderium—the unsatisied
longing of the homesick heart.”31 In fact, the whole life of the Christian, Augustine
had said, is “a holy longing.”32 In the Confessions he describes a piercing and
transient encounter with God: “So in a lash of a trembling glance [I] attained to
that which is. At that moment I saw your ‘invisible nature understood through the
things which are made’ (Rom. 1:20)”—and then the moment was gone, leaving
“only a loving memory and a desire for that of which I had the aroma but which
I had not yet the capacity to eat.”33 Despite the similarity between Augustine and
Lewis’s experiences of this desire, their understanding of its relation to the sensible
world somewhat differs, as we will see later.
Having introduced the concept of Joy, we can now begin to contrast it with
Nygren’s eros-love. The irst obvious question is whether Joy is a love at all.
Admittedly, Lewis rarely speaks of it as a love. But we can infer quite a bit from
one occasion where he does. A helpful (albeit brief) passage from Surprised by Joy
may serve as our starting point. “There was no doubt that Joy was a desire (and, in
so far as it was also simultaneously a good, it was also a kind of love)” (SJ, 208).
This remark, made almost in passing, is full of possible implications. What does
Lewis mean by “good”? And what “kind” of love is at stake? Does “insofar as Joy
is a good” imply that it is not always a good? What does “bad” Joy look like, then,
and how is it puriied?
According to Nygren, since the Greek words ἔρως and ἀγάπη have for centuries
been represented in many languages by one word, “love,” it has been only natural
to assume that they stand for “one and the same reality, or at any rate for closely
related realities” (AE, 32). “But the double spell,” as he calls it, “cast upon us by
tradition and language” must be broken (32). Nygren’s historical and analytical
study tries to dispel this mirage from blurring the clear-cut outlines of authentic
Christian love. Eros is exposed as acquisitive, possessive, and self-deifying—in
all ways antithetical to Christian love. Not surprisingly, but I think misleadingly,
Nygren’s model is sometimes referred to as dipartite, since it speaks of “two” loves.
Based on the actual content (if not form) of his overall argument, however, I would
call it monistic. If love is a good, then Nygren’s eros is not love at all, but a kind
of anti-love. Only his agape is love.
30

Burnaby, Amor Dei, 157. The citations are from Augustine’s Enarrationes in Psalmos, cxliv. 15.
Burnaby, Amor Dei, 96.
32
Ibid., 97. The citation is from Augustine’s In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus, 4.6.
33
Augustine, Confessions (trans. Henry Chadwick; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
7.23 (127–28).
31
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In any case, Lewis thinks that to merit the name love, the phenomenon (here,
Joy-as-desire) must be a good. Hence, because Nygren’s eros is derogatory, Lewis
would probably not number it among loves proper. We remember that he could not
deny need-love the name “love,” because it was not an evil. Loves can, of course,
degenerate into “complicated forms of hatred” or even “demons” (FL, 17).34 Such
dangers notwithstanding, unlike Nygren’s eros, Joy is potentially a kind of love.
What kind of love, then, is it?
Is it a virtue like the “four” loves?35 Virtues are good traits or dispositions that,
together with vices, form one’s character and can be acquired or bolstered by
training. But Joy, Lewis believed, “is never in our power” (SJ, 24). It is wholly
spontaneous. For years he thought that by returning to the context (poems, music,
or nature) that had originally evoked Joy, he could help reawaken it. Desires,
however, are always for an object. Having been preoccupied with his inner states,
he had erected obstacles for real occasions of Joy or smothered them upon arrival.
After realizing the blunder, he could redirect his attention from this “self-defeating
predicament”36 of summoning Joy.
Consequently, it follows that in this sense Joy was in his power after all.
Paradoxically, by not yearning after it Lewis could hinder less, if not exactly
excite, the arrival of Joy, as “it arrived unexpectedly when he was preoccupied with
other matters.”37 Walter Hooper has called this the “Law of Inattention.”38 There
is a peculiar kind of proactive passivity in Lewis’s mature understanding of Joy.
Perhaps it would be correct to say that as an uncalled-for feeling or experience,
Joy in itself is not a virtue proper; uncontrollable reawakening is different from

34
The word “demon” or “demoniac” appears twenty times in The Four Loves. Rather than a
literal evil spirit, in Lewis’s thinking love-as-a-demon is often a form of idolatry. Especially erotic
love may usurp the allegiance that belongs to God only. See Olli-Pekka Vainio, “The Aporia of
Using ‘Love’ as an Argument: A Meditation on C. S. Lewis’ The Four Loves,” The Chronicle of
the Oxford University C. S. Lewis Society vol. 4 no. 2 (2007) 21–30. Vainio slightly miscalculates
(“eighteen times”).
35
Caroline Simon warns that the title of The Four Loves is misleading. Lewis’s model includes
“at least four different parameters: (1) Love for the Sub-personal versus Love for Finite Persons
versus Love for God; (2) Natural Love versus Supernatural Love; (3) Need-love versus Gift-love
versus Appreciative Love; (4) Affection versus Friendship versus Eros versus Charity” (“On Love,”
148). These taxonomies should all be taken lightly. Lewis says we “[m]urder to dissect” (Four Loves,
26): in real life the elements of love mix. Elsewhere Lewis salutes Thomas Usk for “his attempt
at integration: he is not content with [a] water-tight division of human desires” (The Allegory of
Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition [1936; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986] 227).
36
John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (2nd ed.; Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 2007) 38.
37
Mona Dunckel and Karen Rowe, “Understanding C. S. Lewis’s Surprised by Joy: ‘A Most
Reluctant’ Autobiography,” in C. S. Lewis: Life, Work, and Legacy (ed. Bruce L. Edwards; 4 vols.;
Westport, CT: Praegan, 2007) 3:257–78, at 267.
38
Walter Hooper, C. S. Lewis: A Complete Guide to His Life and Works (New York: HarperCollins,
1996) 577–78.
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cultivation by intentional habituation. But it can reverberate into a more consistent
and enduring relation to the world, a relation which can be either virtuous or vicious
(more of this below).
What about Lewis’s tripartite division of need-love, gift-love, and appreciative
love? Where does Joy stand in this taxonomy? Whether Joy is need-love or giftlove depends on the subject. In Joy, our being is responding to some fundamental
need. Joy is human longing for something, whether lost or never endowed. We will
discuss agency more thoroughly in the penultimate section, but in anticipation we
may say that in some sense God can also be regarded as both the eficient and inal
cause of Joy. After all, the human person is the object of God’s “arrows of Joy”
(SJ, 217). The emerging picture looks paradoxical. Insofar as God is its cause, Joy
as our need-love is his gift-love to us. Joy is what Lewis experienced when God’s
love touched him and gave him an anticipatory, transient taste of bliss.

Joy as a Value-based Love of Desire
What exactly does Lewis mean by “appreciative love”? It is an element in love that
can gradually grow into “full appreciation of all beauty,” and which we can “hardly
help calling disinterested, toward the object itself” (FL, 25 [italics in original]).
Lewis explains: “It is the feeling which makes a man unwilling to deface a great
picture even if he was the last man left alive and himself about to die; which makes
us glad of unspoiled forests that we shall never see; which makes us anxious that
the garden or bean-ield should continue to exist” (25–26). In short, “we pronounce
them, in a momentary God-like sense, ‘very good’ ” (26). This afirmation or
“almost homage” is “a kind of debt,” and it can be offered “not only to things but
to persons” (26) and also to God Himself (159).
Joy is markedly appreciative and value-based in this respect. It does not bestow
or create the value of its objects (as Nygren’s agape does), but acknowledges and
appreciates the value that already is. Its objects or catalysts have one aspect in
common: beauty. Lewis later narrowed this quality down to goodness, later still to
holiness, and inally to the holiness of a Divine Person. Joy taught Lewis to love
disinterestedly. He learned that “it is more important that Heaven should exist than
that any of us should reach it” (SJ, 199) and that “a thing can be revered not for
what it can do to us but for what it is in itself” (218).
Joy and Nygren’s eros are both value-based, but not precisely in the same way.
The difference is a nuanced but important one. Joy, as we have seen, can appreciate
the object for its own sake (insofar as the object is God or the experience of Joy
itself). In Nygrenian terms, to appreciate the goodness of an object is erotic, but to
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appreciate the object “disinterestedly” is agapic. In this way, Joy overcomes the
antithesis of Nygren’s “central contrast” between erotic and agapic love.39 Nygren
does not, of course, believe any such overcoming is possible.
What about Joy’s relation to the sensible world? Nygren distinguished between
three kinds of erotic relations. The irst two he called “Hellenistic” eros: “vulgar”
eros gloriies and idolizes the sensible, whereas “heavenly” eros is ascetic and holds
the sensible in contempt (AE, 49–52). Gnostic “love feasts” (orgies) exemplify the
irst (AE, 308) and the Symposium the second.40 Lewis would agree with Nygren
that these could hardly be squared with the Christian approach, which forbids
idolatry and contempt alike. For instance, of desire in the sublimated “heavenly”
sense Lewis writes:
The thought of the Symposium, like all Plato’s thoughts, is ruthless, and the
more fervid, the more ruthless. The lowest rung of his ladder is perversion;
the intermediate rungs are increasing degrees of asceticism and scientiic
clarity; the topmost rung is mystical contemplation. A man who reaches it
has, by hypothesis, left behind for ever the original human object of desire
and affection. . . . There is no possibility of adapting this scheme in its full
rigour to a [Christian] heterosexual love.41

Joy does not ind its ultimate fulillment in the material, or even in the aesthetic,
but it is disdainful of neither. We may of course be tempted to contempt. Lewis
explains how disillusionment from his repeated failures to uncover the source of
Joy eventually led him to “a retreat, almost a panic-stricken light” (SJ, 191) from
the pursuit of Joy. Yet instead of repenting his idolatry, he “viliied the unoffending
images” (193).42 Joy itself, however, neither idolizes nor viliies nature, even if
sometimes we do.
Does Joy arrange the goods in nature in an ascending hierarchy of their value,
like Nygren’s eros does? There is little evidence that it does. Nature walks, books,
poetry, and sex are all equally valuable as reminders of and pointers toward the
transcendental. Instead of an ascending hierarchy of value, there is simply a giant
ontological leap from beings to Being itself.43
39

“For the essence of religion,” in Lewis’s view, “is the thirst for an end higher than natural ends;
the inite self’s desire for, and acquiescence in, and self-rejection in favour of, an object wholly good
and wholly good for it” (“Religion Without Dogma?” in C. S. Lewis: Essay Collection and Other
Short Pieces [ed. Lesley Walmsley; London: HarperCollins, 2000] 163–78, at 167).
40
Both types are explained in the Symposium (180D), but only one is promulgated.
41
Lewis, English Literature, 10; see also Allegory of Love, 5 and 97.
42
In Allegory of Love, Lewis quotes Spenser’s Nature, who “grudg’d to see the counterfet should
shame the thing it selfe” (328).
43
When Lewis discovered “that pleasure (whether that pleasure or any other) was not what you
had been looking for,” his “frustration did not consist in inding a ‘lower’ pleasure instead of a
‘higher.’ It was the irrelevance of the conclusion that marred it” (SJ, 161). Lewis clearly believed in a
hierarchical order of value present in the universe, even if Joy’s relation to it is not hierarchical. See
the chapter “Hierarchy” in his A Preface to Paradise Lost (1942; repr., London: Oxford University
Press, 2010) 72–81, esp. 72.
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With this, we arrive at the third kind of erotic relation, which Nygren calls
“Augustinian” or “Catholic.” Although Joy’s relation to creation is not hierarchical,
it is nearer to the Augustinian relation than to any other. Nygren admits that
Augustine’s (and following him, Catholicism’s) conception of longing seems
from the outset very different than the Hellenistic conception. Both the starting
point and goal are different: We are not “disguised divinit[ies]” (AE, 517), and the
distinction between God and us “is never abolished; even at the highest point of
spiritual life the distance is preserved” (518). For Augustine and for Lewis, the
material world is not the problem. Nygren knows that Augustine actually “attacks
the common idea of Eros theory that evil is to be traced to corporeality” (537). The
problem, then, is egocentricity. Selish pride is “the deepest root of sin” (538) and
can only be uprooted by graced humility. But even this leaves Nygren dissatisied,
for humility, he suspects, is only pride disguised.
The reason Nygren is so adamantly hard to please in this case is simple. For him,
there is no such thing as a desire that is “simultaneously a good.” Desire itself is
evil. It contaminates all possible relations. The anthropological foundation for his
understanding of desire is his understanding of needfulness. “The sense of need
is an essential constituent of Eros; for without a sense of need acquisitive love
would never be aroused. . . . Only that which is regarded as valuable can become an
object of desire and love” (176). There is simply “no room” for “any spontaneous
and unmotivated love” (176). It follows that “all desire, or appetite, and longing
is more or less egocentric” (180).
Lewis’s understanding of the needfulness at the heart of desire stands in
diametrical opposition to this, as noted above. For him, need is a natural and nonsinful constituent of all human love, including both its highest forms and spiritual
longing. Lewis would probably nod in approval of Augustine’s position faithfully
paraphrased by Nygren: “Desire is the mark of the creature; it is grounded in God’s
own will and plan. . . . So, far from being evil and reprehensible, desire . . . is in the
highest degree good and praiseworthy, inasmuch as it gives expression to man’s
actual position as a created being” (AE, 479–80 [italics in original]). In fact, “God
has created man such that he must desire, must love and long for something” (482
[italics in original]). Nygren might agree that desire is “the mark of the creature,”
but only in the dimension of the fallen creature. Desire may be natural, but there
is certainly nothing neutral about it, let alone good or praiseworthy.
Philip Watson, in his translator’s preface to the revised reprint of Agape and
Eros (1953), defends the author against critics who argue “that Eros is ‘neutral’
to man in the sense that it is an essential characteristic of human nature” and that
“God is the author of Eros” (AE, xxi). This is “an odd” argument, he says, because
we “might as well say that God is the author of sin—which in one sense is only
too ‘natural’ to man” (xxi).44 Watson’s remark is highly revealing. In no place is it
44
Lewis himself has traced the multifarious meanings of “nature” and “natural” in his Studies
in Words (1960; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2008) 24–73.
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more evident that certain important disagreements in “the Nygren debate,” including
the character of needfulness, result from diverging anthropological and theological
presuppositions. Nygren himself, I believe, saw this clearly. In passing and without
further comment, he explained that the reason why John Burnaby’s (1938) and
Martin D’Arcy’s (1945) responses come to different conclusions from his own is
essentially that “they start from different premisses” (AE, xiii).45 This is, of course,
just another way of saying that Nygren himself starts from different premises.
All of this is highly relevant to the important question of praeparatio evangelica.
Nygren says that “there are elements of truth” (AE, 161) in the view that, at least
historically, religious longing has prepared ground for the Gospel as a “forerunner of
Christianity” (162). However, since religious longing is intimately linked with eros,
it could also be described as Christianity’s “most dangerous rival” (162). Which one
are we to emphasize? Nygren’s answer is most telling. “From a purely historical
point of view, therefore, it is scarcely possible to reach a deinite decision. . . . In
our present discussion, where we are concerned to show the essential difference
between the Agape motif and the Eros motif, the main emphasis will naturally
have to be placed on the rivalry between them” (162). That is to say, Nygren
emphasizes their rivalry because he is concerned with emphasizing their rivalry!
For the irst time, it seems, Nygren hints at the real possibility of spiritual longing
(eros) developing into faith (agape), but the line of thought is cut abruptly.46 Instead
of afirming the link between the sense of smell and fragrance (the divine) he cuts
it in fear of stench (self-divination).
Shifting the metaphor from scent to sight, Lewis asks, “How if there is a man
to whom [the spilled] bright drops on the loor are the beginning of a trail which,
duly followed, will lead him in the end to taste the cup itself? How if no other trail,
humanly speaking, were possible?” (PR, xvi). Desire points the way, but only grace
can make the journey possible. The longings stirred by nature and other catalysts
helped Lewis to understand what is meant by “the ‘love’ of God” (FL, 30). “Nature
cannot satisfy the desires she arouses nor answer theological questions nor sanctify
us,” but at least for Lewis, the love of nature was “a valuable and, for some people,
an indispensable initiation” (FL, 31).47

Burnaby’s Amor Dei and D’Arcy’s The Mind and Heart of Love were the irst full-length
rebuttals of Nygren’s theses.
46
Conlating faith and love is not my doing but Nygren’s (see e.g., AE, 117–19, 125–27). As
Watson explains, although “the love of man for God of which the New Testament speaks” can
be called agape, “its character as response is more clearly marked when it is described (by St.
Paul especially) as ‘faith’ ” (AE, xvi–xvii). Gene Outka also notes how “Nygren proposes that in
place of ‘love for God’ one substitute ‘faith’ ” (Agape: An Ethical Analysis [New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1972] 47).
47
In Surprised by Joy, Lewis says that the lower life of imagination is “not necessarily and by
its own nature” the beginning of, nor a step toward, the higher life of the spirit, but “God can cause
it to be such a beginning” (159 n. 1).
45
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In The Pilgrim’s Regress, Lewis symbolized by “North” and “South” things
that he calls “equal and opposite evils” (PR, xvi). The Northerners are “the men
of rigid systems whether sceptical or dogmatic, Aristocrats, Stoics, Pharisees,
Rigorists.” The Southerners are by their nature less deinable: “boneless souls
whose doors stand open . . . with readiest welcome for those . . . who offer some
sort of intoxication. . . . Every feeling is justiied by the mere fact that it is felt; for
a Northerner, every feeling on the same ground is suspect” (xvii). North and South
are allegorical images of theological extremes:
The one exaggerates the distinctness between Grace and Nature to sheer
opposition and by vilifying the higher levels of Nature (the real praeparatio
evangelica inherent in certain immediately sub-Christian experiences) makes
the way hard for those who are at the point of coming in. The other blurs
the distinction altogether, latters mere kindliness into thinking it is charity
[agape] and vague optimisms and pantheisms into thinking that they are
Faith, and makes the way out fatally easy and imperceptible for the budding
apostate. (xvii)

Lewis clariies that these extremes “do not coincide with Romanism (to the North)
and Protestantism (to the South)” (xvii).48 It seems obvious that Lewis would count
Sehnsucht among the sub-Christian experiences and Nygren among the men of rigid
systems. In no ambiguous terms: Nygren’s belief (that all desire is evil) is itself evil.
The American philosopher John Beversluis, however, is not impressed by
Lewis’s understanding of Joy. He thinks that it suggests that Lewis “understands
neither the Socratic-Platonic theory of desire nor the Judeo-Christian doctrine of
sin.”
The Socratic-Platonic view knows nothing of the radical evil in human beings
insisted on by Christianity and accounts for their pursuit of false objects by
saying that they are ignorant and pursue false objects inadvertently and involuntarily. The Judeo-Christian doctrine, on the other hand, knows nothing
of the Socratic-Platonic notion of an innocent and good-oriented desire and
claims that human beings pursue false objects deliberately and knowingly.49

To think, as Lewis does, that we long for God as object of desire but shrink
from him as just judge is to contrive “a conceptual hybrid that lacks the authentic
pedigree of both parents” (58). Beversluis is, of course, right. Lewis’s understanding
of Joy lacks the uniltered pedigree both to the Socratic-Platonic theory of desire
48
If we are surprised by the direction of this clariication, it is only because we happen to be
reading in the post-Lubacian era something that was written in pre-Lubacian times. Ever since the
Second Vatican Council, theological landscapes have, if not been turned topsy turvy, been greatly
shufled. While it does not surprise us, it may have surprised Lewis’s immediate audience to learn
that “Barth might well have been placed among my Pale Men, and Erasmus might have found
himself at home with Mr Broad” (PR, xvii).
49
Beversluis, Rational Religion, 57. The preface to the second edition of his book (see footnote
36 above) is no exaggeration: it is still “the irst [and only] full-length critical study of C. S. Lewis’s
apologetic writings” (9). The following page numbers refer to this book.
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and to a certain Christian doctrine of sin. As it so happens, Beversluis is consciously
operating under the tutelage of Nygren’s doctrine of desire and sin! Surprised by
Joy, he declares, “documents Lewis’s unsuccessful attempt at (what Anders Nygren
calls) ‘the Hellenisation of Christianity’ ” (59).
Beversluis notes correctly that on the question of spiritual longing as potential
praeparatio evangelica Nygren and Lewis disagree. Lewis believed in the possibility
of “forgivable honest ignorance.” Beversluis thinks that this is a humane idea, but
one that “cannot be taken seriously” (62). Why not? Because sin “is not honest
error, but open rebellion” (64). There are “undeniable tensions” between the two
claims, and this “irresolvable discrepancy . . . is the result of Lewis’s unsuccessful
attempt to synthesize two incompatible—or, at least, incongruous—philosophical
traditions” (59). Whether or not Lewis’s attempt is unsuccessful, Beversluis is surely
right about the tensions. However, following Nygren, he translates tension into
antithesis. Either sin is ignorance and desire innocent, or sin is rebellion and desire
megalomania. Lewis believed it was not a question of either–or but of both–and.50
According to Nygren, wanting it both–and was, here and elsewhere, Augustine’s
“fatal law” (AE, 470) as well. He had tried to unite things which “by their nature
cannot be united” (561).51

Joy as the Pursuit of Happiness
The second main characteristic of Nygren’s eros is that it is “egocentric love” (AE,
175). This overlaps with much of what has already been discussed regarding needlove, so we may instead focus on desire as the pursuit of happiness.
All desire and longing, Nygren said, is more or less egocentric. “But the clearest
proof of the egocentric nature of Eros is its intimate connection with eudæmonia”
(AE, 180). Christian love, on the other hand, “is spontaneous in contrast to all
activity with a eudæmonistic motive.” In layman’s terms, it “is free from all selish
calculation” (AE, 726). Eros is soaked in “a eudæmonistic scheme” (AE, 530) that,
for our purposes, can be broken into four interconnected claims: 1) Eros pursues
50
For Lewis, the non- or pre-Christian life is not determined primarily or exclusively by sin,
but also by ignorance, misinformedness etc.—not so much that sin is ignorance as that sin is not
all deining. I am thankful to Judith Wolfe for insight on Lewis’s hamartiology. In Augustine’s
summary of Christian doctrine (Encheiridion, 22), “the two causes of sin” are ignorance (failure
of intellect) and inirmity (failure of will).
51
Beversluis is one of the irst to mention Nygren in connection with Lewis viz. the link between
eros and Joy. For this perceptiveness he deserves credit. (Another scholar who has contrasted the
two is Gilbert Meilaender in his The Way that Leads There: Augustinian Relections on the Christian
Life [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006], especially the chapter, “Desire.”) Unfortunately, he seems
unaware of Lewis’s familiarity with, and rejection of, Nygren and his theses. He chides Lewis for
his understanding of Joy because it cannot be squared with a certain doctrine of sin—the one Lewis
happened to reject. Beversluis concludes his deconstruction of Joy rather unlatteringly: Joy is “a
preoccupation . . . we ought to ignore,” “of no importance,” “a narcissistic project,” “a childish thing,”
and the “self-important claim that reality [physical nature] is just not up to one’s lofty standards is
not profundity; it is adolescent disenchantment elevated to cosmic status” (Rational Religion, 67–69).
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individual happiness, and 2) this pursuit is morally tainted, because 3) it is possessive
and selish (incapable of agapic sacriice), 4) and “uses” objects of love as its means
to happiness. How does Joy fare against this four-fold eudaemonistic charge?52
The differences are fundamental. Except for the irst claim, it is dificult to
square them in any respect. Lewis likens spiritual desire in the soul to the chair in
King Arthur’s castle in which only one could sit: “And if nature makes nothing
in vain, the One who can sit in this chair must exist” (PR, xv). Beversluis53 notes
that in endorsing that nature makes nothing “in vain,” Lewis commits himself
to a teleological anthropology and positions himself in the natural law tradition
among Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hooker. (It was the sixteenthcentury English theologian Richard Hooker who said, it “is an axiom of nature that
natural desire cannot utterly be frustrate.”54) Teleology further solidiies Lewis’s
distance from Nygren, who saw it as another reprehensible mark of eros (AE, 94).
The natural law tradition to which Lewis belonged holds that the human telos, the
goal towards which we by nature are oriented, is human lourishing or happiness.
Lewis explains that Joy “must be sharply distinguished” from happiness and
pleasure.
Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic, and one only, in common
with them; the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again.
Apart from that . . . it might almost equally well be called a particular kind
of unhappiness or grief. But then it is a kind we want. I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever . . . exchange it for all the pleasures in the
world. (SJ, 24)

Joy is distinct from all pleasure, “even from aesthetic pleasure. It must have the
stab, the pang, the inconsolable longing” (SJ, 74). Beversluis offers a synopsis
of the distinction between Joy and pleasure that is helpful here, since its logic,
I think, applies admirably to happiness as well: “Joy is pleasurable, but it is not
the same as pleasure; and its pleasurable aspect is not the whole story. Insofar
as it is bittersweet, it is also painful.”55 Lewis not only distinguished Joy from
happiness, he actually said it might be called a particular kind of “unhappiness,”
but paradoxically a kind we want. What should we make of this? Joy is not pure
happiness, but does it not pursue it?
It must be noticed that longing itself is described as a kind of unhappiness, not
the object of longing. Since Joy itself can be one of the objects (we can long for
Joy), one could argue that unhappiness is sought for insofar as the experience of Joy
52
I have elsewhere contrasted this four-fold exposition with Lewis’s eros (i.e., romantic love). See
Jason Lepojärvi, “Does Eros Seek Happiness? A Critical Analysis of C. S. Lewis’s Reply to Anders
Nygren,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophi 53 (2011) 208–24.
53
Beversluis, Rational Religion, 42.
54
Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: A Critical Edition with Modern Spelling
(ed. Arthur S. McGrade; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 83.
55
Beversluis, Rational Religion, 37–38.
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demands it. But surely this cannot be taken rigorously. The words “an unhappiness
we want” are rhetorical. What they underscore is the bitter sweetness. Insofar as Joy
is bitter, it is a kind of unhappiness, but it is still happiness insofar as it is sweet. If it
lacked sweetness we would not ind it “more desirable than any other satisfaction”
(SJ, 24, [italics added]). In one sense happiness and pleasure are its by-product,
but in another sense, I think, we cannot deny that Joy is the longing for fulillment
in a very intense and meaningful way, since it is our inborn desire for God who,
Lewis believes, gives “the [only] happiness that there is,”56 and “union with [His
divine] Nature is bliss and separation from it horror” (SJ, 219). The pursuit of Joy
and the pursuit of eudaemonia are kindred drives, if not one and the same thing.
Nygren well knows that eudaemonia is understood in many ways. “To this
question different philosophical schools had given different answers: . . . pleasure
of the senses . . . spiritualised enjoyment . . . independence of the self . . . and so
forth” (AE, 501; see also 44). Augustine, Nygren says, looked to the transcendent
for something more dependable, and he found it in God: “He is the source of our
happiness, He is the end of all desire.”57 What this really means, Nygren explains,
is that Augustine merely substituted a heavenly “bribe” for an earthly one,
because solution “implies no condemnation of [the] egocentric and eudæmonistic
question” (503).58 Authentic agape “has nothing in common with individualistic and
eudæmonistic ethics”; instead of the egocentric quest for one’s “highest good,” what
is sought is “the Good-in-itself” (44–45). Nygren is consequently uninterested in
what kind of happiness is pursued. The problem for him is the pursuit of happiness
itself, which (like all desire) is possessive and selish.
In Augustine’s notion of caritas, which Nygren calls Augustine’s botched
“synthesis” of eros and agape (which eventually “Luther shatters” [AE, 692]),
God is supposedly loved
for His own sake, as the highest good, the object which gives inal blessedness. But the blessedness does not consist in loving—that is, desiring and
longing for the highest good—but in possessing it. . . . But that means that
Caritas is made relative and ranked as a means—inevitably, since all love, as
Augustine thinks, is desire.” (510–11 [italics in original])59
56

Lewis, Problem of Pain, 38
Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 10.3 (cited in AE, 502).
58
Compare this to Lewis’s sermon “The Weight of Glory”: “Those who have attained everlasting
life in the vision of God doubtless know very well that it is no mere bribe, but the very consummation
of their earthly discipleship” (Essay Collection [ed. Walmsley] 96–106, at 97).
59
Nygren’s main worry here, that we “use” God, may be a misunderstanding. According to
Burnaby, Nygren’s strong suspicion of Augustine’s caritas results from miscomprehending uti (“to
use”) and frui (“to enjoy”). The legitimate uti-love of creation is real love, not instrumental love.
God alone is to be enjoyed, but “God alone is not to be loved. . . . A means which can be loved is
not only a means. The keyword is referre ad Deum, ‘relation to God’, and the distinction of uti and
frui is merged in the ‘order of love’ ” (Burnaby, Amor Dei, 106; italics in the original). Creation
is “wrongly loved if it is preferred to God” (Ibid., 107). Outka says, “Burnaby takes book-length
pains to treat [Augustine] sympathetically” (Outka, Agape, 177).
57
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Where does Joy stand in relation to this? Is the sweetness in the desiring or in the
possessing? Lewis says Joy eclipses the distinction. Joy “makes nonsense of our
common distinction between having and wanting. There, to have is to want and
to want is to have” (SJ, 158). The desire itself is desirable, and experiencing it is
“the fullest possession we can know on earth” (158). This may sound complicated,
but “it is simple when we live it” (PR, xii).60 Many “anti-Romantic” debunkers of
this emotion seemed to Lewis to be “condemning what they did not understand”
(xv). What is more, Joy is not necessarily incapable of sacriice. Lewis had hoped
that the “heart of reality” could be symbolized “as a place; instead, I found it to
be a Person. For all I knew, the total rejection of what I called Joy might be one of
the demands, might be the very irst demand, He would make upon me” (SJ, 217).
Having found the heart of reality and (without fully understanding it) having in a
way completed its task, Joy was ready for renunciation. This demand, however,
God never made.61
We noted above Nygren’s suspicion of Augustine’s idea of humility as the
antidote to egocentricism. Nygren thought that humility, too, may be calculatingly
“offered” to God as a price for a prize, as means to one’s fulillment. Obviously in
such a reading the distinction between humility and pride evaporates, making the
words redundant. Lewis is less pessimistic. He is aware of pride’s snares (“how
magniicently we have repented!” [FL, 148]62), as is Augustine, though Nygren
fails to mention it. But Lewis might say that snares imply a reality that can be
manipulated; a mirage of an oasis presupposes real oases. Only by understanding
and experiencing the real is the counterfeit exposed.
Nygren’s suspicion of humility may rest on a superficial notion of its
implications. At least for Lewis, humility is not some nonchalant and half-forced
admittance that one is not God. Rather, in its full-blown vigor, humility implies
the acceptance of unmerited grace accompanied by the awareness of the reality of
personal sin. Lewis’s own quest for Joy ended in such graced introspection: “For
the irst time I examined myself with a seriously practical purpose. And there I
found what appalled me; a zoo of lusts, a bedlam of ambitions, a nursery of fears,
a harem of fondled hatreds” (SJ, 213). The quest for Joy, longing for fulillment in
God, is not necessarily pridefully blind to one’s ignorance and inirmity but may
contribute to exposing them.

60

Dunckel and Rowe, “Understanding C. S. Lewis,” 267: “The satisfaction is the desire, not
the possession.”
61
After his conversion Lewis largely lost interest in Joy, but for a different reason. Joy “was
valuable only as a pointer to something outer and other. While that other was in doubt, the pointer
naturally loomed large in my thoughts” (SJ, 224).
62
He continues: “As Bunyan says, describing his irst and illusory conversion, ‘I thought there
was no man in England that pleased God better than I.’ Beaten out of this, we next offer our own
humility to God’s admiration. Surely He’ll like that? Or if not that, our clear-sighted and humble
recognition that we still lack humility” (FL, 148 [italics in original]). See also Simon, “On Love,” 156.
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Nygren’s four-fold “eudaemonistic scheme” was: 1) Eros pursues individual
happiness, and 2) this pursuit is morally tainted, because 3) it is possessive and
selish (incapable of agapic sacriice), 4) and uses objects of love as means to
happiness. Joy has intimate commerce with personal happiness. That is where the
similarities end. As for the jump from “1)” onward, Lewis simply refuses to make
it. His theological anthropology does not allow it. The accusation that “desire for
one’s fulillment or happiness” is “wrong,” is in his view “an accretion which has
crept into Christian thinking from Kant and the Stoics.”63 In other words, Nygren’s
suspicion is an un-Christian accretion.

Joy as Human Endeavor Towards God
The third and inal feature of Nygren’s three-fold eros, somewhat overlapping with
the irst two, was that it is “man’s way to the Divine” (AE, 175). For this, we return
to Lewis’s irst recorded thoughts on Nygren in that early January letter in 1935 to
his colleague Janet Spens. The letter’s irst two paragraphs discuss Nygren’s theses.
You will have begun to wonder if your Agape & Eros was lost forever! It is
an intensely interesting book. I am inclined to think I disagree with him. His
central contrast—that Agape is selless and Eros self-regarding—seems at
irst unanswerable: but I wonder if he is not trying to force on the conception
of love an antithesis which it is the precise nature of love, in all its forms,
to overcome.
Then again, is the contrast between Agape (God active coming to man passive) and Eros (man by desire ascending to God qûa passive object of desire)
really so sharp? He might accuse me of a mere play upon words if I pointed
out that in Aristotle’s “He moves as the beloved” (κινεῖ ὡς ερωμενον [sic])
there is, after all, an active verb, κινεῖ. But is this merely a grammatical accident—is it not perhaps the real answer? Can the thing really be conceived
in one way or the other? In real life it feels like both, and both, I suspect, are
the same. Even on our human level does any one feel that the passive voice
of the word beloved is really exclusive—that to attract is a—what do you call
it—the opposite of a deponent?64

As we remember, Lewis ended with the resolute decision to “tackle him again. He
has shaken me up extremely.”65
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The irst important thing to notice is that each paragraph presents a different
contrast within Nygren’s overall juxtaposition of agape and eros with which Lewis
is “inclined to disagree.” Lewis begins by stating what he thinks is Nygren’s “central
contrast”: that agape is selless and eros is self-regarding. Although he believes this
antithesis is forced upon the proper nature of love, he does not elaborate on this
further here. Of course, he would later pick up the point in The Four Loves with
his non-antithetical concepts of gift-love and need-love.
But the second paragraph introduces a second contrast between agape and eros.
This has nothing to do with the “central contrast,” the purported selless (gratuitous)
and self-regarding (needful) nature of agape and eros. I press the point because
it supports my conviction that Lewis was, from the very outset, conscious of the
multidimensionality of Nygren’s eros and probably never intended need-love as
an exhaustive translation. Even to the words “Then again” at the beginning of the
second paragraph I would attach a more than rhetorical meaning. They should be
read as “Leaving the central contrast aside.” The second contrast is between “God
active coming to man passive” (agape) and “[active] man by desire ascending to
God qûa passive object of desire” (eros). Lewis has misgivings about this as well.
In fact, implicit in Lewis’s remarks is a tentative accusation of three different but
interconnected mistakes.
The irst mistake is hermeneutical: Nygren may have misrepresented Greek
thought. His portrayal of the “Platonic ladders,” the human hero actively climbing
the stairs towards a passive Deity, is a caricature. Lewis does not believe Aristotle’s
choice of the active verb κινεῖ (“moves”) is accidental. Thirty years later, Lewis
picks up this theme in The Discarded Image (1964) when discussing Aristotle’s
teaching of God as the Prime (Unmoved) Mover.
[W]e must not imagine Him moving things by any positive action, for that
would be to attribute some kind of motion to Himself and we should then not
have reached an utterly unmoving Mover. How then does He move things?
Aristotle answers, κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον, “He moves as beloved” [Metaphysics,
1072b]. He moves other things, that is, as an object of desire moves those
who desire it.66

The hermeneutical question of interpreting Aristotle correctly, however, is less
important than the ontological question. What interests Lewis is “the real answer.”
This is Nygren’s second mistake: a failure to correctly analyze desire itself. In
the relation of desire and its object, is one wholly active and the other entirely
passive? Nygren believes so. But Lewis is hesitant and appeals to ordinary human
66
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experience. “Even on our human level does any one feel that the passive voice of
the word beloved is really exclusive—that to attract is a—what do you call it—the
opposite of a deponent?” To say that something is “exclusive” is to say that it repels
all explanations but one, in this case the passive voice smothering the active one.
But what, exactly, is the opposite of a deponent? A deponent is passive in form but
active in meaning; the opposite of a deponent, then, is active in form but passive
in meaning. The object of desire (beloved) and its pull (to attract) are neither. In
real life, Lewis thinks, activity and passivity mingle.
Nygren’s third and most important mistake, noted almost latently in Lewis’s
hermeneutical and ontological correctives, is to transpose his grammatical and
ontological errors into theology. Lewis appealed to interpersonal human relations
(“even on our human level”) to underscore a truth that he thinks applies to the
interpersonal God-human relation too. According to Nygren, pre- and non-Christian
theologies depict God as wholly passive and us as wholly active, whereas true
Christian theology admits us no role. Any attempt to adopt a positive account of
human desire amounts to “a betrayal of Agape” (AE, 232). Nygren has shaken him
up extremely, but Lewis is inclined to disagree.
Lewis is not unaware of the tension between the two kinds of theologies. “Both
[theologies] can speak about the ‘love of God’. But in the one this means the thirsty
and aspiring love of creatures for Him; in the other, His provident and descending
love for them.”67 Nygren’s inluence is clearly detectable. Aspiring love is eros,
and descending love is agape. Lewis believes that the antithesis, however, is not
a contradiction. Why not? Because a “real universe could accommodate the ‘love
of God’ in both senses.”
Aristotle describes the natural order, which is perpetually exhibited in the
uncorrupted and translunary world. St John (‘herein is love, not that we love
God, but that he loved us’) describes the order of Grace which comes into
play here on earth because men have fallen. It will be noticed that when Dante ends the Comedy with ‘the love that moves the Sun and the other stars’, he
is speaking of love in the Aristotelian sense.68

The natural order and the order of Grace are evenly valid. “A real universe” can
accommodate both, and we inhabit a real universe. We are created and fallen, not
one or the other.69

67

Lewis, Discarded Image, 113–14.
Ibid., 114 [italics added, except Comedy].
69
Lewis explains that while there is no contradiction, the antithesis explains why many spiritual
writers (unlike Dante) show little interest in the natural order. “Spiritual books are wholly practical
in purpose, addressed to those who ask direction. Only the order of Grace is relevant” (Discarded
Image, 114).
68

228

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

It would be a mistake to think that Lewis himself discarded all the medieval
images discussed in The Discarded Image. He held no belief in “a concept of Grace
which simply abolishes nature,”70 and he distrusted “that species of respect for the
spiritual order which bases itself on the contempt for the natural.”71 Lewis’s creationembracing outlook, including his afirmation of human loves, can be expressed by
the age-old theological-metaphysical maxim Gratia non tollit naturam sed pericit.
Perfecting without abolishing is what Lewis called “transposition.”72 Basically, it
is “the looding of a lower medium and the raising of it to a new signiicance by
incorporation into a higher medium.”73 Human loves, too, of all kinds—including
Joy—are subject to this logic.
Lewis’s own view of love is certainly closer to the medieval conception than to
Nygren’s predestinarianism. For that is what is really at stake here: human agency.
According to Nygren, when it comes to authentic love, “all choice on man’s part is
excluded. Man loves God . . . because God’s unmotivated love has overwhelmed him
and taken control of him, so that he cannot do other than love God. Therein lies the
profound signiicance of the idea of predestination: man has not selected God, but
God has elected man” (AE, 213–14). The point is underscored repeatedly: “He [the
Christian] is merely the tube, the channel, through which God’s love lows” (735).74
Allowing the human person any positive role, even a responsive one, smacks
of mysticism, which Nygren highly distrusts. He refers to mysticism derogatorily
throughout Agape and Eros as “wholly eros” in which “we raise ourselves” to the
level of God.75 Lewis’s approach to mysticism is much more amicable.76 A rare
exception is the passage in The Four Loves when he warns: “We must not begin
with mysticism, with the creature’s love for God” (FL, 144). This echoes Nygren’s
view of mysticism, insofar as it means the creature’s love for God.77 But the point it
stresses is that the initiative lies on God’s side, not that creaturely love is somehow
70
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sinful. Not even in The Four Loves is our love for, and ascension to, God disparaged.
On the contrary: “Only those into which Love Himself has entered will ascend into
Love Himself” (FL, 155). Nygren would absolutely shun such language.
In all of Lewis’s popular publications, it seems he uses eros and agape in the
speciically Nygrenian sense only once. According to Nygren, philosophical
idealism is “in continuous line” with the eros-tradition (AE, 221). Philosophical
idealism happened to be Lewis’s own position in a transitional phase of his spiritual
journey. In Surprised by Joy, a few pages before his inal conversion, Lewis calls
philosophical idealism “quasi-religion”: “all a one-way street; all eros (as Dr.
Nygren would say) steaming up, but no agape darting down” (SJ, 198). There
was “nothing to fear, but also nothing to hope” (198). And yet, is not this passage,
too, covertly critical of Nygren? Philosophical idealism or “watered Hegelianism”
(210), as Lewis also calls it, its Nygren’s model splendidly, but not any particular
branch of Christianity.
When this phase was revealed as incomplete quasi-religion, longing itself was
not abandoned, but only a unilateral idea of longing—Nygren’s eros, in effect—and
the counterfeit purporting to be its satisfaction, an impersonal Absolute.78 Lewis
found philosophical idealism wanting because it lacked a personal God who, in
love, dives and offers us his saving hand. He did not ind it wanting because we, in
longing and responsive love, look (or steam) up to grasp at this hand. Lewis believed
that human persons can aspire and respond to God’s love without supposing they
can save themselves. People are not passive tubes.
In a qualiied sense, then, Joy can be described as a human drive towards God.
The endeavor is human, but not self-suficient. Yet it is not an automaton or conduit
either. Of the actual moment of his inal conversion, Lewis wrote: “I know very
well when, but hardly how, the inal step was taken” (SJ, 223). Nygren resolves the
paradox of desirous free will and God’s sovereignty in one direction. For good or
ill, Lewis refuses to solve it at all. In fact, he almost embraces it instead by calling
it “this beautiful oxymoron.”79 In actual experience of conversion, freedom and
compulsion somehow fuse. This experience is beautiful and oxymoronic for the
same reason: the paradox is saved.80
78
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Eros Puriied

It is time to draw together the relevant afinities and point out the remaining
differences between Nygren’s eros and Lewis’s Joy.
In his novel Out of the Silent Planet, Lewis imagines intelligent creatures (the
hrossa) on Mars whose language distinguishes different kinds of longing. “There
were two verbs which both . . . meant to long or yearn; but the hrossa drew a sharp
distinction, even an opposition, between them. . . . [E]veryone would long for it
(wondelone) but no one in his senses could long for it (hlutheline).”81 Here we meet
the difference between “good” and “bad” Joy. Wondelone is proper and meaningful
longing, while hlutheline is somehow “bent.” Longing can be corrupted in two
interconnected ways. It may seek fulillment in the wrong way or in the wrong
objects. Both are implicit here. An unfallen race (the hrossa) would not stubbornly
seek to possess beauty (wrong way) or seek ultimate fulillment in created goods
(wrong objects) that in reality serve as catalysts or pointers.82 The puriication of
longing takes place on these two fronts. Lewis would agree with Augustine, here
accurately paraphrased by Nygren: “Desire is not to be rooted out, but puriied
and directed to the right objects” (AE, 439 [italics in original]). Caroline Simon
agrees that, for Lewis, “Charity [agape/grace] works both to perfect and order our
natural loves.”83
Human love in all its forms, Lewis believed, is by its very nature the overcoming
of Nygren’s “central contrast,” the antithesis between selless and self-regarding
love. Joy, insofar as it is a good, is a kind of love. By its very nature, then, Joy
overcomes this contrast in relation to God via created nature. Joy also overcomes
Nygren’s “second contrast” between a wholly active/passive God versus a wholly
active/passive human person. In other words, Joy contains elements of Nygren’s
eros and agape both, which in Lewis’s model are broken down into need-love,
gift-love, and appreciative love.
In one sense, nothing in Nygren’s three-fold eros corresponds to Lewis’s Joy
without qualiications. Lewis thinks Nygren’s eros is a caricature, an abstract idea
that does not capture our lived experience (just as Nygren’s agape is a caricature
of excellent love). It follows that, since Joy represents for Lewis a real good in
sync with a real universe, then by deinition it cannot be a synonymous translation
of Nygren’s unreal eros. Joy is a qualiied and puriied version of the derogative
exaggeration that is eros. Because it is an exaggeration, it is qualiied, and because
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Nygren – Eros

Valuebased love
of desire

Lewis – Joy

it derogative, it is puriied. This is another way of saying that Joy is Nygren’s eros
in all three ways, but with a little twist. The differences that remain help to highlight
what Lewis thought amiss in Nygren’s three-fold portrayal of human longing.
Looking back, have the reinements not been more or less agapic?

YES

Hierarchical
Eudaenature
monistic
idolized or
teleological
viliied

NO

YES

Egocentric
possessive

Human
drive
toward God

Selfsuficient

NO

YES

NO

Joy, like eros, is a value-based (or value-directed) love of desire. Instead of
bestowing value on its objects, it perceives and appreciates the value that already is.
However, unlike eros, it is not hierarchical in its appreciation. Directed by grace, it
may relect the true nature of created goods and thus neither idolize nor vilify them.
Joy, like eros, is the pursuit of happiness, but it is neither calculating nor
instrumental. The self is necessarily present, but not mere selishness. Our very
being is pierced by a God-given desire for fulillment, and this desire should not be
short-circuited by bad theology. “The deception,” Lewis thinks, is “in that prosaic
moralism which conines goodness to the region of Law and Duty, which never
lets us feel in our face the sweet air blowing from ‘the land of righteousness,’
never reveals that elusive Form which if once seen must inevitably be desired with
all but sensuous desire.”84 Joy also eclipses the distinction between desiring and
possessing: to desire God is in one sense to already enjoy him, and to enjoy him
is to ever desire him.
Joy, like eros, is a human drive towards the Divine, but it is not delusionally
self-suficient. In relation to God, initiative lies with Him, but the human person
is not a wholly passive tube. The responsive role it plays is no illusion. We can
rightfully speak of the soul’s search for God, though Lewis says that ultimately this
is “a mode, or appearance (Erscheinung) of His search for her,” since the “very
possibility of our loving is His gift to us, and since our freedom is only a freedom
of better or worse response.”85 Lewis, unlike Nygren, ultimately resists attempting
to “solve” the paradox of God’s sovereignty and human spiritual longing.
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The puriication of desire is no simple matter. Although desire is not to be
rooted out, the pride that perverts it is. And because we are not simply ignorant
and imperfect but also rebels in arms seeking autonomy, our self-surrender will be
painful, since “to surrender a self-will inlamed and swollen by years of usurpation
is a kind of death.”86 Rooting out pride is both death and evolution. It is not simply
death, because the desire is puriied. Nor is it simply unproblematic evolution either,
because pride is broken.87 Lewis’s theological vision may be “best described as,
quite simply, Augustinian.”88
On several issues that still divide Christendom, such as theological anthropology,
hamartiology, soteriology, and the relation of nature and grace, he “demonstrates
sensitivity to both Catholic and Protestant emphases.”89 For good or ill, Lewis
cannot be accused of what Burnaby has called Protestantism’s “obtuse insistence
[on] Either–Or.”90 We have seen that this applies also to his theology of love, and
especially to the God-human relation.91 In the end, Lewis concludes that we can
keep Nygren’s idea of eros and agape “after we have let all his exaggerations fade
out of our minds.”92 Far from jeopardizing the Gospel, spiritual longing is a Godgiven desire that prepares the way for it.
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